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Abstract 
The question of who decides when a state has not met its international 
responsibilities (and therefore forfeits the right to non-intervention) and what 
kind of international action should be taken (from limited intervention to full-
blown regime change) divides liberal foreign policy thinking.  To understand the 
nature of that division, and what is at stake, this paper distinguishes 'neoliberal' 
from 'liberal internationalist' approaches and locates them in an English School 
understanding of international society.  Where the latter stresses the importance 
of observing the procedural norms centred on the United Nations, the former 
contests the legitimacy of such norms if they fail to deliver substantive liberal 
outcomes.  The paper then interprets British foreign policy discourse either side 
of the 2003 Iraq conflict through the prism of this debate.  The central claim is 
that a more cautious approach to the use of force and American unilateralism has 
not silenced the critique of the UN system and that the international reaction to 
the Libyan intervention prompts the kind of reflection that continues to separate 
neoliberal from liberal internationalist approaches. 
Keywords 
Liberal internationalism, liberal conservatism, international society, British foreign 
policy, Kosovo, Iraq, Libya. 
 
Introduction 
The rhetoric accompanying a liberal foreign policy too often fails to distinguish the tension 
between its component parts: the rule of law, human rights (including humanitarian protection) 
and democracy promotion.  These values can sit together comfortably in domestic politics, but 
historically the rule of international law has promoted a pluralist order based on the sovereign 
equality of states.  This involves tolerating undemocratic regimes that are abusive to their own 
people and can harbour revisionist ideologies that potentially threaten international peace and 
security.  This has led to the criticism of a universally inclusive concept of international society 
that is centred on the UN Charter and the commitments to non-intervention in Article 2(4) and 
collective decision-making in Chapter VII.  There are generally two aspects to this critique.  The 
first involves questions about the rights and responsibilities at the state-level: what kind of 
responsibilities does the state have to fulfil to make certain it does not forfeit the traditional right 
to non-intervention?  The second involves questions of rights and responsibilities at the 
international level, specifically the question of who decides when a state has not met its 
responsibilities (and therefore forfeits the right to non-intervention); and who decides what kind 
of international action – from limited intervention to full blown regime change - should be 
taken.  The purpose of this paper is to show how answers to this second question expose a 
division within liberal approaches to foreign policy.  It then demonstrates how this divide can be 
used to interpret a discourse surrounding recent British foreign policy and to shed light on the 
normative question of how the liberal state should act in contemporary international society. 
To understand the liberal state‘s relationship to international society the paper draws on an 
English School framework of analysis, specifically Barry Buzan's depiction of Martin Wight‘s 
three traditions: Realism: Rationalism and Revolutionism (see figure 1).1  The central argument is 
that a liberal foreign policy is best located on either side of what Buzan identified as the 
‗progressive/solidarist‘ boundary that separates Rationalist from Revolutionist approaches.  This 
is because liberal solidarists (unlike conservative pluralists) share the view that human rights are 
universal, that democracy is an ideal form of government for all societies, and that the society of 
states should facilitate the protection and promotion of these substantive goals rather than stand 
in their way.  Neoliberal internationalism however shades into Buzan‘s Revolutionist segment.2  
This is not simply because it argues states have a responsibility to protect their citizens‘ most 
basic human rights and that when they fail to do this they forfeit any claim to the sovereign right 
of non-interference.  It shades into Revolutionism because it insists that the procedural norms 
centred on the UN Charter lack legitimacy and that democratic states in particular have a greater 
moral authority to decide when an international intervention advances the common good and 
what shape that intervention should take.3  
Liberal internationalism, on the other hand, accepts the universal applicability of substantive 
liberal values such as human rights protection and democracy promotion, but it also transposes 
the procedural norms of democratic deliberation to the international level.4   The inclusiveness of 
the UN system is, from this perspective, necessary in order to discover what the international 
common good is and to decide how best to act on it.5  This insistence that the liberal state acts in 
accordance with an international consensus articulated at the UN keeps liberal internationalists 
within the Rationalist segment of Buzan‘s model.  That position is cemented by a concern that 
the pursuit of substantive liberal agendas (e.g. democratic regime change) in ways that do not 
command a consensus at the UN risks provoking a pluralist ‗counter-offensive‘ within 
international society and even power-balancing behaviour.6  The English School model again 
helps to illustrate this.  To prevent international society regressing toward the conservative-
pluralist boundary, or even collapsing into an anarchic international system (again see figure 1), 
liberal internationalism counsels a more cautious and less ambitious approach to the pursuit of 
substantive liberal goals than neoliberal internationalism.  This is not a matter of compromising 
on liberal goals for the sake of international order.  It instead reflects the view that substantive 
liberal agendas are best advanced gradually and in the context of a universally inclusive 
international society centred on the UN Charter.  
To illustrate the interpretive value of adding this distinction to the ES framework the paper is 
divided into four sections.  The first elaborates on the ES approach, adapting it to illustrate how 
the competing conceptions of an appropriate liberal foreign policy fit into this scheme.  The 
second section applies the analytical framework to help interpret and assess the shift in UK 
foreign policy under New Labour, focusing on how the 2003 decision to support the American-
led invasion of Iraq can be understood as an extension of the critique of the UN system 
contained within the neoliberal position.  The third section examines the impact of the Iraq War 
on elite discourse in the UK.  The central claim is that a more cautious approach to the use of 
force and American unilateralism did not silence the neoliberal critique of the UN system; nor 
did it reverse the argument that liberal states have a responsibility to intervene to prevent 
humanitarian emergencies in other states.  This is illustrated with reference to the continued 
advocacy of liberal interventionism by significant voices on the political left, as well as David 
Cameron‘s articulation of ‗liberal conservatism‘.  It is also evident in the UK‘s response to the 
violence that accompanied the democratic uprising in Libya, which is examined in the final 
section of the paper.  Liberals were, for the most part, united in the defence of this intervention 
because it was able to square the humanitarian imperative to protect civilians with the legal 
imperative of a UN mandate to use force.  However, the accusation that the NATO-led coalition 
went beyond that mandate to pursue a more ambitious liberal agenda of ‗regime change‘, and 
that this caused a ‗pluralist counter-offensive‘ that includes emerging powers such as Brazil, 
South Africa and India, prompts the kind of reflection that divides neoliberal from liberal 
internationalists.  The paper concludes by defending the Libyan operation against its critics but 
argues that there are aspects of the pluralist critique that cannot be dismissed by appeals to the 
superior moral authority of liberal democratic states. 
 
The liberal state in international society  
Buzan‘s call for reconvening the English School articulated the virtues of methodological 
pluralism.  The English School‘s interpretivist approach, he argued, offered an opportunity to 
step outside the ‗tedious game of competing IR theories‘ and ‗cultivate a more holistic, integrated 
approach to the study of international relations‘.   The three traditions – which Buzan called 
Hobbesian or Machiavellian Realism; Grotian Rationalism and Kantian Revolutionism were ‗in 
continuous coexistence and interplay‘.  The question English School theory prompts is ‗how 
strong they are in relation to each other‘ at any one time.7  
 
INSERT FIGURE ONE 
 
The concept of international society is portrayed in this scheme as the via media between an 
anarchic international system where politically diverse states compete for power and security and 
a world society that gives legal and political expression to a universal moral community of 
humankind.  The Rationalist tradition focuses on the shared norms, rules and institutions that 
maintain the sense of society and order between politically diverse states.  ES theorists working 
within that tradition have drawn distinctions between what Buzan represents as ―conservative 
pluralism‖ and ―progressive‖ or ―liberal solidarism‖.  The distinction rests on the depth of the 
political consensus across international society, as well as the means by which that consensus is 
identified.  As the label suggests, conservative pluralists tend to emphasise the diverse nature of 
global politics, arguing that the level of consensus between states is ‗thin‘.  Their conception of 
international society, and responsible state action within it, is therefore somewhat limited.  It 
rests only on an ‗ethic of coexistence‘, which is ‗a response to the fact and implied value of 
diversity on a global scale‘.8  International society in these circumstances is limited to the goal of 
sustaining order and conservative pluralists reject the pursuit of substantive liberal goals such as 
humanitarian protection and democracy promotion as imprudent and irresponsible.  As Hedley 
Bull put it: ‗the right of Western powers to protect the political rights of citizens‘ of other 
countries can, if ‗answered in a certain way, lead to international disorder, or even the breakdown 
of international society itself.‘9   
Liberal solidarists, on the other hand, are more committed to the pursuit of substantive liberal 
goals because of their sense that a universal community of humankind exists but is repressed by 
the existence of illiberal and undemocratic regimes. What keeps the liberal commitment to 
humanitarian protection and democracy promotion in the Rationalist segment of Buzan‘s 
scheme is the sense that the authority to intervene on behalf of substantive liberal goals only 
derives from a pragmatic consensus that emerges from the process of deliberation across the 
society of states; a process that in contemporary international society is set out in the UN 
Charter.  This is what Andrew Hurrell identifies as a ‗liberal constitutionalist‘ position.10  It 
‗meshes‘ with the pluralist approach to the extent it insists that international consensus can only 
be derived from a process of negotiation that involves all states regardless of their ideological 
make-up.11 The claim here is that this kind of ‗liberal constitutionalism' is central to the liberal 
internationalist approach, which emerged from the republican idea that liberal values at the state 
level are best defended and promoted by a system of collective security at the international level.  
This is because collective security can reduce the pressure on states to adopt the kind of self-help 
defence strategies that double-up as tools of internal repression.  As Dan Deudney notes, the 
Wilsonian concept of ‗making the world safe for democracy‘ did not mean arming democratic 
states and giving them license to overthrow non-democratic regimes.  ‗Making the world safe for 
democracy‘, from this perspective, meant creating a secure international society that would 
enable states to disarm (and thereby give up the tools of repression).12  Liberty in other words 
was contingent on, not separate to, the creation of a collective security system that included non-
democratic states. 
This emphasis on collective decision-making does not mean liberal internationalism necessarily 
capitulates to a conservative pluralist view of substantive liberal agendas.  The substantive 
outcome of international decision-making processes is not preordained and it is not impossible 
for illiberal or undemocratic states to authorise international action in the pursuit of substantive 
liberal goals.  The UN Security Council has for instance authorised the use of all necessary means 
for the purpose of humanitarian protection, including most recently Resolution 1973 (2011) on 
Libya (see below).  It can, however, mean compromising on the ambition of the substantive 
liberal agenda.  Because the UN Security Council contains non-democratic regimes it is unlikely 
that it would ever authorise the use of all necessary means for the purpose of democratic regime 
change.13  Compromising on this (and any) aspect of the substantive liberal agenda out of respect 
for the procedural norms of international society can be frustrating, especially for those that 
ground such an agenda in what Hurrell refers to as a ‗cosmopolitan moralist‘ position.14  This 
proclaims the inherent value of human rights and democracy promotion to be self-evident and 
judges the value of international legal procedures in terms of how well they advance these 
principles.  From this perspective the liberal internationalist position runs into difficulties 
explaining why action that can effectively advance a substantive liberal agenda should be subject 
to UN authorisation; and why governments that cannot claim their own democratic mandate 
should be included in processes that determine how best to advance the global common good.15 
An implication of these internal tensions in the liberal internationalist position is that states can 
legitimately by-pass those international procedures (e.g. the exercise of the Security Council veto) 
that fail to deliver outcomes that protect and promote substantive liberal values. A further 
implication is that existing democratic states should have greater authority to speak on behalf of 
the common good.  To paraphrase Ian Clark: the corollary of the liberal state‘s expressed 
preference for democratic government domestically is that democratic states must have a greater 
entitlement to speak on behalf of the whole.   From this neoliberal perspective, ‗value-rationality‘ 
takes precedence over ‗rule-rationality‘ and it finds expression in proposals to replace the 
legitimising role of the UN with a ‗league of democracies‘.16   
These neoliberal proposals have been criticised on both a practical and normative level.  While 
accepting that the UN is ‗a deeply flawed and heavily politicised body‘, for instance, Andrew 
Hurrell notes how the ‗league of democracies‘ idea has ‗no institutional embodiment or deeply 
imperfect ones (as in the claim that NATO as a military alliance should play such a role)‘.17  More 
significantly, acting on the self-evident character of liberal values is ‗normatively unacceptable 
and politically unviable‘ because it risks opening ‗the door to a situation in which it is the 
strength of a single state or group of states that decides what shall count as law‘.18  The danger 
from this perspective is that the use of force to pursue substantive liberal goals without a UN 
mandate will be seen as illegitimate because it by-passes the inclusive procedures that articulate 
the international common good.  That in turn will prompt a ‗pluralist counter-offensive‘ within 
the society of states, making it doubly difficult for liberal states to act according to their values.  
So, again paraphrasing Clark, those who feel excluded will make appeal to national sovereignty, 
and to the virtues of pluralism in international society, turning the century-old Wilsonian 
programme of making the world safe for democracy into even more hazardous project.19  
The liberal internationalist response to the tensions between UN procedures on the one hand 
and a substantive liberal agenda of humanitarian protection and democracy promotion on the 
other is therefore to warn against elevating the latter at the expense of the former.  For all its 
faults, the UN remains the only body that can claim to legitimately represent international society 
as a whole.  This does not necessarily mean adopting a strict legal constitutionalist position.  The 
exercise of a veto might indeed be ‗unreasonable‘ (especially in situations involving mass 
atrocity), but in reaching this judgment due consideration has to be given, at least from the liberal 
internationalist perspective, to the weight of opinion at the UN, either in the Security Council or 
the General Assembly.20  This majoritarian view of what might constitute international legitimacy 
carries with it the kind of risks to international order that pluralists warn against.  After all, the 
veto was originally included in the Charter to encourage the great powers to commit themselves 
to the UN and collective security.21  But the key point is that these risks are mitigated if the state 
acting on behalf of international society can claim legitimacy by pointing to a democratic, if not a 
legal, mandate.  As the following sections show, this distinction is crucial to interpreting recent 
British foreign policy and its relationship to international society.  
 (Neo)liberal internationalism and the New Labour government. 
As Rhiannon Vickers and others note, liberal internationalism has long been at the centre of the 
Labour party‘s worldview and foreign policy.22  This can be traced back to the ambiguity that 
those on the left had about supporting World War I.  As a member of the Second International 
‗the party was expected to oppose the war‘, which was seen as the product of the imperialist 
systems of the old European order, but this was hardly sustainable after Germany‘s assault on 
neutral Belgium and the patriotic fervour that swept the country.  Like President Woodrow 
Wilson, therefore, Labour‘s support for the War went hand-in-hand with a reformist 
international agenda.  Its 1916 Statement of War Aims, for instance, insisted that ‗the 
fundamental purpose of the British labour movement in supporting the continuance of the 
struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy‘.23  To that end it called 
for the creation of a League of Nations at its party conference of January 1917 because it too 
understood, as Labour leader Arthur Henderson put it, that war, and preparations for it, 
‗paralyses the impulse towards social progress and spreads black despair in the hearts of men and 
women devoted to great causes‘.24   Indeed, when Wilson‘s Peace without Victory speech was 
delivered on the eve of that conference ‗the delegates stood cheering when it was read to them‘.25   
Yet in many respects the inter-war history of Labour and foreign policy characterises the internal 
tension within liberal internationalism.  Collective security by itself could not guarantee the peace 
that facilitated democratic social reform so long as militaristic and fascistic regimes existed.  The 
League could not be discarded for ideological reasons but neither did it enable isolationism or 
disarmament.  What emerged instead was a ‗pragmatic‘ form of liberal internationalism, which 
countenanced the use of force in support of the League‘s objectives.26  But that too sat 
uncomfortably with those who, while witnessing the growing strength of fascism, called on the 
League to ‗purge‘ itself of certain states and to reengage with power politics.27  And again, 
following World War II, Labour‘s ‗insistence on the primacy of the United Nations‘ did not 
prevent the emergence of a strong preference for Atlanticism, which prioritised ‗the special 
relationship‘ with the US and the NATO alliance.28  As Paul Williams notes, the Labour Party 
and its members had always disagreed over how ‗the different strands of liberal internationalism 
should be interpreted, which should be prioritised in a given context, and whether they were 
actually achievable in the real world.‘29 
The real world context of course changed dramatically with the collapse of Soviet power, yet the 
question of how to balance the norms articulated in the UN Charter with the defence and 
promotion of substantive liberal values remained.  These were exposed most obviously by the 
humanitarian situation in Bosnia and the Conservative government‘s argument that there was a 
limit to what outside forces could do, both as a matter of principle and practice.  This stance 
was, moreover, supported by the Labour frontbench in opposition.30  As Serb bombardments of 
Bosniak enclaves became increasingly violent, however, Labour backbenchers began to call for 
military intervention.  What we see in these arguments is the emergence of a neoliberal position 
that elevates the state‘s right to decide when the moral imperative to act on substantive liberal 
values dictates an exception to procedural norms.  From this perspective the overlap between a 
narrow or conservative view of the national interest and the UN commitment to consensus-
based and impartial peacekeeping ‗smacked of appeasement‘.  A more discriminatory approach 
was needed, one that elevated substantive liberal goals (humanitarian protection) over the UN 
process.  This is best articulated in the letter 17 Labour MPs sent to The Guardian. 
 
The time has come to use military force to end the systematic assaults upon Srebrenica 
and other civilian populations in Bosnia ... We believe the left has a particular duty to 
stand up against the kind of pure, racially motivated fascism which the Serbian 
aggressors embody.  We must defend the idea of pluralist, multi-cultural, multi-
denominational society which Bosnia represents.  The right may enquire after the 
economic or electoral interests involved intervention but for the left, strong and 
decisive action in Bosnia is now a moral imperative.  
 
The MPs insisted that ‗we must work hard for United Nations‘ approval for military 
intervention‘.  But ‗at the same time‘, they added, ‗a Russian veto must not be allowed to 
condemn civilians to further suffering‘.31  Indeed, this was exactly the position New Labour 
adopted when it was confronted in government by the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.  
Elaborating on the ‗ethical dimension‘ to British foreign policy under New Labour, for instance, 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook defended NATO‘s intervention in Kosovo arguing that the UK 
‗would act on the principle that a UN member state should not be able to plead its sovereign 
rights to shield conduct which is inconsistent with its obligations as a member of the UN‘.   
Noting that the threat of the veto by two of the Permanent Members made Security Council 
action impossible he further argued that under ‗exceptional circumstances, we were still justified, 
in every respect, in intervening as we did‘.32 
The neoliberal character of the Kosovo intervention is mitigated on two counts.  Firstly, the 
ambition of the substantive liberal agenda was limited to humanitarian protection.  Although the 
Milosevic regime later fell, and although Blair later characterised the Kosovo mission as ‗regime 
change‘, this was not the intention in April 1999 when NATO launched its Operation Allied 
Force.33  Procedurally, moreover, a majority of states at the Security Council agreed that the 
humanitarian situation at that time demanded military intervention.  As Cook noted Russia and 
China‘s threat to veto a resolution explicitly authorising the use of force had to be assessed in the 
context of ‗majority support for our cause‘.34  This was evident in the Security Council‘s rejection 
by a vote of 12 to 3 of the Russian resolution condemning NATO‘s action.  In this respect, the 
intervention was characterised by the Independent Commission on Kosovo as being ‗illegal but 
legitimate‘.35 
Neither of these mitigating factors is available when considering New Labour‘s support for the 
American-led invasion of Iraq.  Firstly, the mission was much more ambitious to the extent it 
was committed to regime change and democracy promotion.  Of course, the public justification 
for the use of force was disarmament, but the mission went beyond that to the extent the US in 
particular had equated an Iraqi WMD programme with the character of the Baathist regime.36 
Procedurally, moreover the UK could not claim that a majority of states supported the use of 
force in 2003.  This was acknowledged by the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and UN 
Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock to the Iraq Inquiry.  Indeed, Greenstock‘s contribution to 
the Inquiry is significant for separating the Kosovo operation from the Iraq one.  The UK‘s 
participation in the latter he concluded was ‗legal but of questionable legitimacy, in that it didn't 
have the democratically observable backing of a great majority of member states‘.37         
The legal justification of the war rested on the argument that Resolution 1441 (2002) had 
deemed Iraq to be in breach of its disarmament obligations under Resolution 687 (1991), which 
revived the authority to use force granted in Resolution 678 (1990).38  By enforcing previous 
resolutions the UK was, from Blair‘s perspective, defending the authority of the UN by making 
sure rogue states understood the consequences of defying it.39 But to the extent this 
interpretation of the international common good could not command majority support at the 
Security Council, the Iraq operation should be characterised, in the terms being used here, as a 
neoliberal intervention; and it moved British foreign policy further into the Revolutionist 
segment of Buzan‘s model.   Indeed, this fits with Jamie Gaskarth‘s recent characterisation of 
Blair as a revisionist who was prepared to tear up the rule book of international relations.40   
The decision to support the US-led invasion split the Labour party and the left more generally 
along neoliberal and liberal internationalist lines.  In the March 2003 vote, for instance, 139 
Labour MPs joined all 53 Liberal Democrats to oppose the government, many echoing Robin 
Cook‘s liberal internationalist position.41  From this perspective, the failure to pass the ‗second 
resolution‘, which would have explicitly authorised the use of force, could not be dismissed as 
irrelevant.  This was particularly so given that the UK had tried so hard to secure it.  For Cook, 
Britain was ‗being asked to embark on a war without agreement in any of the international bodies 
of which we are a leading partner‘ and that reflected the weakness of the substantive argument 
for war.  This was different to the Kosovo operation, he concluded.  ‗Our difficulty in getting 
support this time is that neither the international community nor the British public is persuaded 
that there is an urgent and compelling reason for this military action in Iraq‘.42  The fact is, 
however, that 245 Labour MPs voted to support Blair‘s position.  This is an indication of how, 
on the specific question of who decides when a state can use force in the common interest, New 
Labour‘s internationalist approach had a neoliberal quality to it. 
 
British foreign policy after Iraq 
Despite the human and material costs of the Iraq War, UK foreign policy did not retreat to the 
kind of conservative pluralism that characterised the reaction to the Bosnian crisis.  In his speech 
to the 2005 World Summit for instance, Blair developed the theme he had introduced in 1999 as 
a ‗doctrine of international community‘.43  The globalisation of politics made peoples dependent 
on each other.  This made the promotion of liberal values a matter of self-interest.  He 
welcomed the Summit‘s adoption of the Responsibility to Protect document and the idea ‗that 
states do not have the right to do what they will within their own borders, but that we, in the 
name of humanity, have a common duty to protect people where their own governments will 
not.‘44  This too was the message from the Brown government, particularly when it was 
expressed by Foreign Secretary David Miliband.  He insisted that the UK should resist the 
‗traditional conservative ―realist position‖ [which] is to say that values and interests diverge, and 
interests should predominate‘.   It was in the national interest, as well as being a ‗moral impulse‘, 
to help promote democracy, which he insisted was a universally applicable ideal.45   
There was, however, an acknowledgment in these statements that the UK, and liberal 
democracies more generally, had to be conscious of the limited utility of force, as well as a 
recognition that democracy ‗grows in the soil of the nation‘.46  In that respect there was a 
‗defensive‘ character to the substantive liberal agenda that emerged after Iraq.47  So, Miliband 
wrote in 2008 that much of the rationale behind Blair‘s doctrine of international community 
remained valid. 
But to restore belief in the efficacy of intervention we must learn the lessons of Iraq 
and Afghanistan. We must work differently. Intervention should not always be 
military and only rarely be forcible. We must focus on intervening early, before a 
country descends into full-scale conflict - much as the international community did 
in Kenya following last year's election. Where troops are needed, we must plan 
rigorously for the immediate aftermath. The first months after a military intervention 
are critical to maintaining local support and legitimacy. We must recognise that 
military solutions alone will not stop conflict. We need a civilian force - police, 
judges, engineers and others - with the professionalism and responsiveness of the 
armed forces. There needs to be clarity about who is in charge of the international 
presence, rather than fragmentation between countries and between military and 
civilian operations. And perhaps most important of all, we must recognise that it is 
politics not gun fire that ends wars. Military and civilian capacity can play a 
supporting role, but the real solutions are political and driven by the people who live 
in the country.48 
 
This theme was developed further by Labour in opposition.  Shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Alexander, for instance, made much of Joseph Nye‘s argument that power was not simply 
shifting from West to East, it was also shifting from governments to peoples.  Echoing what 
Miliband called a ‗civilian surge‘, Alexander argued that the UK must address its diplomacy not 
just to states, but to peoples and in order to do that it had to adapt to the technologies that were 
dispersing power.   
That means Britain's foreign policy needs to be clear that promoting unrestricted 
access to the internet is in our national interest and promotes our national values. 
We need to look at the export licensing of technologies that filter the internet, 
support online civil society in countries that continue to restrict internet access 
and work with EU partners in providing online journalists the arenas where they 
can post free from censorship by their national governments.49 
 
Such an approach reflected the optimism that greeted the Arab Spring and the role that social 
networking technologies were said to play in mobilising peoples to protest against their 
government.  But it can also be understood as a post-Iraq acknowledgement of the limited utility 
of force as a means of promoting democracy through ‗regime change‘, as well as an extension of 
Miliband‘s argument that progressive foreign policies had to find alternative ways to promote 
liberal values.   
There is also evidence that the Labour party post-Blair was more cautious about ‗tearing up the 
rule book‘ when it came to the procedural norms that governed international action.  Without 
explicitly defending the UN system Alexander argued there was a 
need to demonstrate by our deeds, words and our actions that we are 
internationalist, not isolationist, multilateralist, not unilateralist, active and not 
passive, and driven by core values, consistently applied, not special interests. ... 
Multilateralist, not unilateralist means a rules-based international system.  Just as 
we need the rule of law at home to have civilization, so we need rules abroad to 
ensure global civilization.  We know self-interest and mutual interest are 
inextricably linked.  National interests can be best advanced and protected 
through collective action.50 
 
Likewise, David Miliband expressed caution regarding the idea that democracies had greater 
moral authority to speak on behalf of international society and act according to the mandates 
granted by their own ‗league‘ rather than the United Nations.  ‗You can see the dangers‘, he is 
quoted as saying. ‗You don't want to set up something which undermines the ability of the 
international system to get to grips with difficult issues. Equally though . . . should people with 
the same values work effectively together? The answer must be yes.‘51  
In his effort to put distance between left and right on this issue Alexander argued that the 
Conservative party had retreated to a traditional realism that focused on cultivating bilateral 
relations for the purpose of promoting a narrow conception of the national interest based in 
particular on commercial success.52  This impression is not totally unfounded.53  It does, 
however, understate the extent to which the Conservative party itself adopted a liberal position 
while in opposition and how that too survived the political fallout of the Iraq experience.  In his 
2006 speech to the British-American Project, for instance, Cameron acknowledged the shift that 
was taking place in Conservative thinking on foreign policy.  The emerging position, which he 
called ‗liberal conservatism‘, placed ‗a new Conservative focus on human rights‘ and a 
commitment to ‗the aim of spreading freedom and democracy, and support humanitarian 
intervention‘.54  As with the Labour frontbench, however, there was an acknowledgement that 
external interference, particularly of a forceful kind, was not always appropriate.   
Distancing ‗liberal conservatism‘ from the neoconservatism that was widely considered 
responsible for the Iraq War, Cameron insisted that ‗democracy cannot quickly be imposed from 
outside‘.  The ‗transformation of a country from tyranny to freedom does not begin and end 
with regime change and the calling of elections. ... Liberty grows from the ground - it cannot be 
dropped from the air by an unmanned drone.‘  Echoing the defensiveness of the liberal 
internationalist position, Cameron looked to ‗the knowledge and experience of our diplomats 
abroad, to the work of the British Council, to our expertise in culture, media and 
communications.  As the limits of military power become more obvious, we must use our non-
military power to better effect.‘  Force ‗should be a last resort‘.55 
Following the UK‘s experience in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, therefore, there emerged a cross-
party consensus based on the continuing relevance of the liberal agenda even if it was less 
ambitious.  The all too apparent limitations of what military force could achieve did not lead the 
major parties to a position where they ruled out intervention to prevent mass atrocity.  That is 
testament to the power of the norm that was emerging around the 2005 Responsibility to Protect 
World Summit document.56  But military imposed ‗regime change‘ as a means of pursuing a more 
ambitious substantive liberal agenda (i.e. democracy promotion) was rejected.  Having noted 
that, however, there remained a trace of neoliberalism in Cameron‘s approach to the procedural 
question of who decided when it was appropriate to intervene on behalf of international society.  
This is evident in the fact that he, like English School theorists, drew a distinction between 
‗effectiveness‘ and ‗legitimacy‘ and argued that the UK ‗may need to fashion alliances which can 
act faster than the machinery of formal international institutions‘.  The UN he acknowledged 
‗confers the ultimate legitimacy on any multilateral action. But the very process of securing that 
legitimacy can undermine its effectiveness - as we saw, for example, in the Balkans‘.57  Without 
stating it explicitly, Cameron‘s formulation suggested ‗liberal conservatism‘ was amenable to the 
idea that a coalition-of-the-willing, a league of democracies, or even a single state could decide 
when it was appropriate to use force to protect liberal values even in the face of UN Security 
Council opposition.58  In this respect the post-Iraq check on the procedural aspects of neoliberal 
internationalism was not as profound as it was on the substantive aspect.  The lesson of Iraq was 
not that the procedural norms of the UN system delivered better substantive outcomes.  The 
UK and liberal states more generally had to be more ‗humble‘ about what they could do to 
promote their values, but they need not prioritize the rule-rationality of the liberal internationalist 
approach.        
 
British foreign policy and the intervention in Libya. 
As Tim Dunne noted, the question of whether the Conservative-led coalition government would 
change UK foreign policy would only be properly answered after it had faced its first real crisis.59 
This came early in 2011 when, in response to democratic protests in his country, President 
Muammar Gaddafi threatened mass killing in Benghazi. In advocating intervention Cameron‘s 
government demonstrated that the liberal side of ‗liberal conservatism‘ was not mere rhetoric.60  
Whether Gaddafi‘s threats were genuine was debated.61  The UN Security Council concluded, 
however, that ‗the widespread and systematic attacks‘ taking place in Libya ‗may amount to 
crimes against humanity‘.  It reminded Libya of its responsibility to protect its own population 
and, acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, authorised states ‗to take all necessary measures 
... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any 
part of Libyan territory‘.62   
In this respect the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector bore none of the controversies that 
plagued the Kosovo or Iraq interventions. From a liberal internationalist perspective, the 
intervening states had followed the proper procedure and gained a proper mandate to pursue a 
limited substantive agenda (i.e. humanitarian protection).  There was, to be sure, criticism that 
the use of force by external powers contradicted the principle of national self-determination.  
Seamus Milne for instance argued that the ‗intimate involvement of the US and the former 
colonial powers taints and undermines the legitimacy of Libya's transformation‘.63  This was 
often combined with the argument that there was a self-serving character to the intervention and 
this hypocrisy was exposed by a prior willingness to support authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world, including Gaddafi‘s.64 The government‘s argument that there was a moral and legal 
imperative to intervene, however, had widespread support.  In Parliament, for instance, Ed 
Miliband, who in his first Conference speech as Labour leader had acknowledged that the Party‘s 
decision to support the Iraq War was wrong, drew on the R2P principle, images of his parents 
fleeing terror in Europe and the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War, to support the 
intervention.65    
Yet there was also a warning in Miliband‘s statement to the Commons.  The UK, he insisted,  
must be clear about the mandate of the UN resolution. We all want to see Colonel 
Gaddafi gone, and the Prime Minister repeated that today. None of us, however, 
should be under any illusions or in any doubt about the terms of what was agreed. 
The resolution is about our responsibility to protect the Libyan people—no more, no 
less. ... I say to the Government—and the Prime Minister will know this—it is 
incredibly important that the international community observes the terms of the 
resolution in its actions and in what it says. I shall not rehearse the arguments about 
past conflicts, but we all know that ambiguity about the case for intervention is often 
one of the biggest problems that a mission faces. The House should be clear about 
the degree of difficulty of what we are attempting in securing a coalition from 
beyond western powers to support intervention in another, north African, state, so 
we cannot afford mission creep, and that includes in our public pronouncements.66 
 
Behind these words lay a concern that the government was confusing the ends of the mission 
and that could lead to a level of engagement that neither the country nor the United Nations was 
comfortable with.   
Similar concerns were expressed internationally as NATO-led forces began to implement 
Resolution 1973.  The argument was made that these states were pursuing the more expansive 
liberal agenda of ‗regime change‘ under the cover of humanitarian protection and that they were 
thereby exceeding their mandate.   Brazil, for instance, accepted that there was ‗a humanitarian 
imperative‘ to protect civilians, but insisted states must  
avoid excessively broad interpretations of the protection of civilians, which could 
link it to the exacerbation of conflict, compromise the impartiality of the United 
Nations or create the perception that it is being used as a smokescreen for 
intervention or regime change.67   
 
China too accepted that states could ‗provide constructive assistance‘ but in so doing  
they must observe the principles of objectivity and neutrality and fully respect the 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned. 
There must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any 
party under the guise of protecting civilians.68 
 
Indeed, South Africa‘s articulation of the problem in many ways captures the essence of the 
pluralist critique of neoliberal interventionism.   It warned that  
the pursuit of political agendas that go beyond the protection of civilian mandates 
...will undermine the gains made in this discourse and provide ammunition to 
those who have always been sceptical of the concept.69 
 
And this appeared to be the case later in the year when Russia and China vetoed the resolution 
condemning the violence in Syria.  They argued that liberal states might imply from it a mandate 
to use force and pursue politically motivated regime change.  As the Russian delegate to the 
Security Council put it 
Our proposals for wording on the non-acceptability of foreign military 
intervention were not taken into account, and based on the well-know events in 
North Africa, that can only put us on our guard. ... The situation in Syria cannot 
be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience ... For us 
members of the United Nations, it is very important to know how the resolution 
was implemented and how a Security Council resolution turned into its opposite.70 
 
These sentiments and actions can be interpreted as a manifestation of the pluralist warning 
embedded in the more classical conception of liberal internationalism that respects the rule-
rationality of collective decision-making.  The issue here was less the use of force itself, but the 
accountability of the states that had responded to the Security Council‘s call in Resolution 1973 
to use all necessary means to protect civilians.  Because NATO-led forces had, in the opinion of 
some, abused that authority by pursuing a discriminatory and political objective (regime change) 
under the cover of a neutral and humanitarian mandate (protection of civilians), it had created a 
backlash that weakened the new consensus on which international society was built.71  The 
progress that had been made in consolidating the responsibility to protect norm was, in other 
words, being jeopardised by the neoliberal pursuit of a more ambitious (and unauthorised) 
agenda, namely regime change and democracy promotion.            
Three points can be made in response to this line of reasoning.  Firstly, it is by no means clear 
that NATO-led forces did exceed the terms of the UN mandate.  The UK government‘s 
argument on this was that NATO had not gone beyond the mandate because it had not put 
troops on the ground.  Where British personnel were deployed they were there as ‗mentors‘.  It 
was not a first step to arming the rebels, which would arguably have been a breach of the 
embargo imposed by the Resolution 1970 (2011).72  Secondly, it is not clear that the POC 
mandate could have been pursued without weakening Gaddafi‘s regime in a way that led to its 
eventual collapse.73  In this respect, the British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, has 
argued that it was unreasonable for Russia to claim ‗they were misled or that we [the UK] had 
over-interpreted the resolution‘ because it had been made clear that the protection of civilians 
specifically meant targeting pro-Gaddafi forces.74  The onus was on Russia to bring the issue 
back to the Security Council if it thought OUP had gone beyond the mandate.  Indeed, 
Gaddafi‘s position was largely untenable after he had been referred to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in Resolution 1970 (2011).  Had the Security Council thought Gaddafi had a role to 
play in Libya‘s transition it would not have made that referral or it could have proposed a 
deferral under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.  Government statements that Gaddafi had to go, 
therefore, were not necessarily indicative of unreasonable political goal.  They were merely 
expressions of the will of the international community as reflected in Resolution 1970.   
Finally, it is by no means clear that Security Council discord over Syria and its failure to protect 
civilians in that conflict was a consequence of what happened in Libya.  The geopolitical 
situation surrounding the Syrian situation always made the prospect of Security Council 
consensus difficult.  It also made external military intervention to protect civilians less likely on 
substantive and procedural grounds.  This is picked up by the Defence Committee‘s 2012 report, 
which rejected the implication that action should not have been taken in Libya because that 
made it impossible for the international community to take decisive action over other countries.  
It is impossible for us to tell what the consequences would have been of allowing 
the killing of civilians in Benghazi, but we consider that the determination of the 
Arab League and of most countries of the United Nations that a massacre would be 
unacceptable was an example of the international community acting as it should. It 
was acting in a coordinated way to reflect the adoption by the United Nations in 
2005 of the ―Responsibility to Protect‖75 
 This was echoed in the Government‘s response to the Committee‘s report.  It noted that ‗each 
crisis is unique and there cannot be a ―one size fits all‖ approach to foreign policy‘. In Libya, it 
insisted, ‗there was strong regional support for intervention and a clear United Nations Security 
Council mandate through Resolution 1973 which authorised ―all necessary measures‖ to protect 
civilians.  This will not be the case in every crisis; but the international community has a range of 
tools to support the protection of civilians.‘76 
There is then the potential for a critique of Operation Unified Protector on the grounds that it 
was a neoliberal intervention that pursued objectives outside of an international consensus and 
that this rebounded in a way that made the pursuit of humanitarian protection more difficult.  
Yet this can be countered with reasonable arguments that defend the intervention.  This does 
not mean liberal states should ignore the concerns expressed in the context of the Libyan 
operation.  The neoliberal argument that the voices of undemocratic states on the Security 
Council lack legitimacy misses the point that democratic states have also expressed frustration at 
the use of western power outside the procedural norms of the UN Charter.77  This was evident 
during the Libyan crisis, for instance, in the Indian abstention from Resolution 1973.  It 
expressed concern at the welfare of civilians in Libya but also noted that ‗we do not have clarity 
about details of enforcement measures, including who and with what assets will participate and 
how these measures will be exactly carried out.  It is, of course, very important that there is full 
respect for sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya.‘78  Indeed Brazil, which also 
abstained from Resolution 1973 and expressed its frustration at the manner in which it was 
implemented (see above), reminded states of their responsibilities while protecting by writing to 
the Security Council and the General Assembly.  This included a call for enhanced Security 
Council procedures ‗to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and 
implemented‘, as well as to ‗ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to 
resort to force‘.79   
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was firstly to demonstrate how the question of who decides when a 
state should use force on behalf of international society divides liberals; and secondly to illustrate 
how we can interpret aspects of British foreign policy through the prism of this debate.  Liberal 
internationalists differ from what this article terms neoliberal internationalists to the extent the 
former puts more store by the procedural norms of the UN Charter.  The latter‘s frustration 
with these procedures stems from an assumption that the substantive liberal goals of 
humanitarian protection and democratic regime change are self-evidently in the universal 
common good and that it would be unreasonable on the part of any state to object to action 
designed to advance them.  This tension has characterised foreign policy discourse, particularly 
on the centre-left, which traditionally saw liberal internationalism as providing a progressive 
vision of an international society that liberated individuals by transcending systems of interstate 
competition.  In supporting Blair‘s arguments that the UN had failed over Iraq to act in the best 
interests of international society, and that the US-led coalition-of-the-willing was best placed to 
do that, the Labour Party demonstrated a preference for the neoliberal position that had been 
developing in a different context since Bosnia. 
Locating this debate in the English School framework of analysis offers additional insight.  This 
is not simply a matter of separating the liberal solidarist emphasis on the universality of human 
rights from the conservative pluralist emphasis on moral difference.  The English School 
insistence that these approaches are ‗in continuous coexistence and interplay‘ sensitizes the 
analyst to the possible reaction within international society to a neoliberal policy that is based on 
the argument that certain states (in particular democratic states) have a greater moral authority to 
speak on behalf of the common good.   From this perspective, neoliberals who push their ideas 
too far too quickly ‗set themselves an impossible task and risk undermining the limited degree of 
consensus and order that has been achieved within the society of states‘.80  The evidence 
presented in this article demonstrates how this possibility is manifesting itself in contemporary 
international society.  Although the NATO-led coalition secured a UN mandate for Operation 
Unified Protector, the suspicion that liberal states abused that authority to pursue the more 
ambitious agenda of regime change informed the reaction of many states.  This included the so-
called BRICs, who continued to speak out in the context of the Syrian crisis. 
The emerging power status of those leading the pluralist counter-offensive is significant for 
considering the future of British foreign policy.  Prime Minister Cameron‘s use of force to 
protect Libya‘s civilian population illustrated that the adjective in ‗liberal conservatism‘ was not 
mere rhetoric.  But the British government has, as noted, expressed the need to establish good 
bilateral relations with emerging powers as a matter of self-interest.  As Foreign Secretary 
William Hague acknowledged, this will inevitably impact on the pursuit of liberal agenda to the 
extent it increases the material costs of acting against the pluralist approach preferred by the 
BRIC nations.  ‗We are all agreed‘ he argued ‗that we would try to intervene if another Rwanda 
were predicted ... . But‘ he added ‗in the years and decades to come, the rise of other nations will 
constrain our ability to act in this way‘.81  This suggests an increased sensitivity to the collective 
decision-making procedures that include states that are keen to protect an order based on 
sovereignty and non-intervention.  When one also considers the defence cuts that further limit 
the expectations of what military force can deliver, it is hard not to conclude that the British 
preference for neoliberal internationalism did indeed peak during the Blair years.    
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